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SECURING LAND TENURE & 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
GUINEA SAVANNAH: A GHANAIAN CASE 
STUDY 
 
Michael S. Talbot* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, a comprehensive study commissioned by the World 
Bank dubbed the Guinea Savannah “Africa’s Sleeping Giant.”1  
Covering some 600 million hectares, the Guinea Savannah ranges 
from Guinea Conakry on the west coast of Africa, east to South 
Sudan, as far south as Mozambique, and includes an estimated 400 
million hectares of arable land in nearly two-dozen countries.  Yet 
the World Bank reports that less than 10% of this area is being 
successfully used for agricultural production.2  Simply put (and as 
will be explicated throughout this paper), the Guinea Savannah 
represents a substantial opportunity in the effort towards food 
security and poverty reduction – two of the foundational components 
of human rights promotion. 
There are, of course, myriad reasons why the agricultural 
potential of the Guinea Savannah has gone largely unexploited; 
cultural, political, commercial, financial, and numerous other factors 
are at play.  Nor is the Guinea Savannah a homogenous region, and 
the influence of individual factors inevitably varies as one travels the 
nearly 14,000 kilometers from Guinea Conakry to Mozambique.  
Throughout the continent there is substantial variation in both 
topography and culture.  Yet, a central component of any effort to 
                                                          
*  South Carolina School of Law, Class of 2013.  The author appreciates 
the assistance of Professor Josh Eagle, Whitney Smith, and all the members 
of SCJILB for their support and assistance in the preparation of this note. 
1  MICHAEL MORRIS ET AL., AGRIC. AND RURAL DEV. UNIT, THE WORLD 
BANK, AWAKENING AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT: PROSPECTS FOR COMMERCIAL 
AGRICULTURE IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH ZONE AND BEYOND (2009) 
[hereinafter MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT]; See also Michael 
Morris, et al., A Breadbasket for Africa: Farming in The Guinea Savannah 
Zone, SOLUTIONS, Apr. 2012, at 44 (providing a concise overview of the 
World Bank’s findings). 
2  MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶ 3. 
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promote agricultural development within the Guinea Savannah will 
necessarily entail a consideration of land tenure.  
The central role of land tenure in agricultural development has 
been recognized by the World Bank3 and serves as a major 
presumption of this note.  Strong agricultural development is 
expected to promote food security and poverty reduction therefore 
enabling human rights promotion.  This note demonstrates the 
significance of land tenure, but this is not intended to minimize the 
influence of other factors.  Similarly, a case study of Ghana provided 
in the second half of this note should not be understood as indicative 
of the circumstances throughout the entire Guinea Savannah, but 
simply as an example of the difficulties involved in developing land 
tenure policy and law.   
This note aims to examine the implications of various 
approaches to land tenure and their potential impacts on food security 
and poverty reduction.  No single approach will be promoted because 
no single approach is without its shortcomings, and in a region as 
diverse as the Guinea Savannah there simply is no one-size-fits-all 
solution.  The note is structured in order to provide a context that will 
establish the significance of the discussion, then examine some of the 
theories underlying the various approaches, and finally take a look at 
the application of these theories in the developing world. 
Section I draws heavily from the World Bank’s 2009 
Competitive Commercial Agriculture for Africa (CCAA) study to 
demonstrate why the Guinea Savannah is ripe for agricultural 
development.  The potential of internationally-traded commodity 
crops suited to the region (and already cultivated in parts of it) 
combined with access to regional markets could serve as a 
springboard to greater agricultural and economic development in the 
future.4  After establishing themselves on what Jeffrey Sachs would 
call ‘the first rung of economic development,’5 the people of the 
                                                          
3  See id. ¶ 280. 
4  Id. ¶¶ 60, 88, 90. 
5  JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES 
FOR OUR TIME 73 (2005).  Although many find fault with Sachs connecting 
development directly to the establishment of liberal free markets, this 
connection is widely accepted by the Bretton Woods institutions and is 
frequently a pre-condition for loan eligibility.  See generally Nancy 
Holmstrom & Richard Smith, The Necessity of Gangster Capitalism: 
Primitive Accumulation in Russia and China, 51 Monthly Rev., Issue 9 
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Guinea Savannah might be able to build the momentum to move 
beyond the insecurity of subsistence farming. 
In section II, the immediacy of the need for attention to land 
tenure is demonstrated through a discussion of the current land grab 
occurring throughout Africa.  As commercial interests attempt to 
capitalize on the Guinea Savannah’s potential for food production, 
timber, biofuels, and carbon offsetting, it becomes crucial for 
countries to examine their approach to land tenure.6  As the potential 
for profits increases, commercial interests become more and more 
willing to tolerate the instability that accompanies uncertainty of 
tenure.7  These land developers would prefer strong property rights, 
but it is not commercially viable for them to hesitate and risk losing 
out while others capitalize.  Furthermore, the recognition of property 
rights enables long-term users to make rational decisions about use 
and alienation, encouraging stability.  And a land grab that leapfrogs 
land tenure reform will only exacerbate problems.  
Section III begins the theoretical component of this note, and 
examines the two primary approaches to land tenure.  First, there is a 
consideration of the individual titling approach promoted most 
notably by Hernando de Soto.8  Second, there is an examination of a 
more communitarian approach akin to the customary practices 
indigenous to many parts of the Guinea Savannah.  Finally, there is a 
discussion of the potential for the hybridization of the two 
approaches.  In this section, emphasis is placed on the potential each 
approach provides for agricultural and economic development, the 
                                                                                                                
(Feb.) 2000 (providing examples of criticisms against Sachs) available at 
http://monthlyreview.org/2000/02/01/the-necessity-of-gangster-capitalism; 
Warren Nyamugasira and Rick Rowden, New Strategies, Old Loan 
Conditions: The Case of Uganda (2002), http://www.brettonwood 
sproject.org/topic/adjustment/ugandaanalysis.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) 
(critiquing specific conditions for obtaining loans in Uganda). 
6 See LORENZO COTULA ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ET. AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT 
OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAND 
DEALS IN AFRICA 52–59 (2009), available at http://pubs.iied.org/p 
dfs/12561IIED.pdf?. 
7  As rates of returns increase, the need for long-term certainty 
decreases.  
8  See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) 
(arguing that individual land tenure and other neo-liberal policies form the 
foundation of economic development). 
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appropriateness to the region, and any additional concerns, including 
the protection of vulnerable populations. 
Section IV begins the shift from the theoretical to the applied, as 
consideration is given to the question of scale.  The CCAA 
specifically addressed the question of whether the Guinea Savannah 
will benefit more from a large-scale fee system similar to that 
established in the Cerrado region of Brazil or a smaller fee approach 
like that of Northeast Thailand.9  Both regions exemplify the 
potential impact of successful land tenure reform but they also 
reiterate the importance of tailoring the policy to the region.  Given 
the centrality of the question of scale to formulating a coherent land 
tenure policy, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the experiences in 
Brazil and Thailand in an attempt to glean insight relevant to the 
Guinea Savannah. 
Section V finally takes up the evaluation of land tenure in 
Ghana.  This case study is structured according to a loose chronology 
and traces the development of land tenure in Ghana from the pre-
colonial customary practices through the British colonial period to 
contemporary attempts to direct land use toward development.  In 
these contemporary efforts, one can see both customary and colonial 
influences.10  Consideration is given to both the abstract theoretical 
understanding of land tenure at each stage and the practical 
application as well as the bridge between them.  All of this is colored 
by an understanding of land policy as reflective of the norms and 
values of a society—not only how a people see themselves presently 
but also what they aspire to be in the future.  A brief conclusion sums 
up the central arguments of this note and highlights its main points.  
As is often the case, there may be more questions raised by this 
discussion than answered.  The hope is that a careful consideration of 
the issues will lead to a conscientious approach to land tenure reform.  
If nothing else, the importance of land tenure policy warrants 
                                                          
9  MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 259–79. 
10  See JANINE M. UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY 
LAW, LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 
67–69 (2008); see also CHRISTIAN LUND, LOCAL POLITICS AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY IN AFRICA 88–89 (2008); see also Kojo Sebastian 
Amanor, Night Harvesters, Forest Hoods and Saboteurs: Struggles over 
Land Expropriation in Ghana, in RECLAIMING THE LAND: THE RESURGENCE 
OF RURAL MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 103–106 (Sam 
Moyo & Paris Yeros ed., 2005). 
2012]            SECURING LAND TENURE & AGRICULTURAL 135 
                        DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH: A  
 GHANAIAN CASE STUDY   
thoughtful action on the part of policymakers, stakeholders, and all 
others involved.   
 
I.   “AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT” 
The World Bank’s 2009 CCAA report provides a striking 
recognition of Africa’s potential for economic development.  The 
report was the result of a collaborative effort between the World 
Bank; the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO); the governments of Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom; 
and numerous other development institutions.  It connects economic 
development to agricultural development and recognizes great 
potential for the latter in the Guinea Savannah.11  The CCAA report 
draws on field surveys of three representative countries within the 
region: Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia.   
The CCAA report hopes to provide ideas for how countries 
within the Guinea Savannah might replicate the substantial 
agricultural development gains made in Brazil and Thailand during 
previous decades.12  The report proposes that countries in the Guinea 
Savannah establish competitiveness in low-value commodities such 
as cassava, cotton, maize, rice, soybeans, and sugar by exploiting 
preferential access in local and regional markets.13  This access is the 
result of both formal incentive programs and the practicalities of 
global logistics.14  The authors of the CCAA report believe that by 
cultivating these low-value commodities and competing in regional 
markets, local producers will establish a foundation upon which they 
can later expand to higher-value commodities and a more global 
market.15  
But this begs the question: Why the Guinea Savannah?  
Certainly this approach to agricultural development is not unique to 
Africa and has already been applied in Brazil and Thailand as well as 
elsewhere around the world.  Furthermore, the fertility of the Guinea 
Savannah is neither a recent development nor a particularly unique 
                                                          
11  MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶ 354. 
12  Id. ¶ 5. 
13  Id. ¶¶ 116–118. 
14  Id. ¶¶ 123–125. 
15  See id. ¶¶ 83–90. 
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characteristic, so what makes the region ripe for agricultural 
development? 
The CCAA report points to five factors that distinguish the 
Guinea Savannah: (1) steady economic growth suggests good 
prospects for demand in domestic markets; (2) recognition on the 
part of governments of the importance of agricultural development 
and their willingness to shape policy toward that end; (3) the 
strengthening of business interests in many African countries often 
associated with infrastructure development; (4) increased interest on 
the part of both domestic and foreign investors; and (5) the 
availability of technologies that improve crop yields and were not as 
widely available during the boom years in Brazil and Thailand.16  
Combined, these five factors constitute a perfect storm of potential 
for agricultural development: 
(1) Farmers have a market that demands their 
product.17  
(2) Farmers are incentivized to produce by 
government programs.18  
(3) Farmers have improved access to markets as a 
result of improved roads, communication, and 
electricity, and rural populations have been 
empowered to take a more active role in 
development.19  
(4) Farmers have the ability to obtain capital from 
both foreign and domestic investors, which they 
can then use to improve their abilities.20 
(5) Farmers can take advantage of available 
technology to improve crop yield and quality.21 
These are, of course, broad generalizations, and agricultural 
development in the Guinea Savannah is not without its hindrances as 
well.  Among these are the following facts: (1) international 
                                                          
16  Id. ¶¶ 354–60. 
17  Id. ¶ 356. 
18  Id. ¶ 357. 
19  Id. ¶ 358. 
20  Id. ¶ 359. 
21  Id. ¶ 360.  
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competition is significantly more substantial than it was when Brazil 
and Thailand underwent their booms; (2) Africa has other priorities it 
needs to address separately from agricultural production, including 
HIV/AIDS and climate change, which not only distract from the 
attention required of agricultural production (and not without reason) 
but also have a direct impact on it; (3) that although policy makers 
have been vocal in their commitment to agricultural development, 
their actions have not always manifested those commitments; (4) the 
lack of follow-through is also present in donor organizations and has 
suffered particular stress during the recent economic downturn; and 
(5) the heterogeneity of the region and the potential for political 
instability or bureaucratic congestion could raise transaction costs 
and hinder economic activity.22 
It is not necessary here to go into much more detail concerning 
the opportunities and obstacles noted in the CCAA report – the 
Guinea Savannah possesses the level of potential that the sobriquet of 
“Africa’s Sleeping Giant” suggests.  The CCAA report presents a 
number of policy recommendations and interventions that the authors 
believe will assist the nations of the Guinea Savannah in capitalizing 
on this potential.  These recommendations include increasing private 
and public investment, implementing public sector reform to promote 
good governance and stability, promoting awareness of potential 
social and environmental impacts in order to mitigate their effects, 
institutional reforms, and others.23  But of the recommendations, the 
authors seem to suggest that land policy reform is of particular 
importance.24  Consequently it is this initiative that is the focus of 
this paper; undoubtedly, the other initiatives have a significant role to 
play as well but ultimately clarity first requires focusing one’s 
attention.    
 
II.   THE LAND GRAB 
The urgency of examining land tenure systems in Africa is made 
apparent by a 2009 report funded by the FAO, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).  The 
authors of the report examined land acquisitions during the five years 
                                                          
22  Id. ¶¶ 362–69. 
23  Id. ¶¶ 370–71. 
24  Id. ¶ 374. 
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prior in five African countries including Ghana.  All of these 
countries have territory within the Guinea Savannah, and have 
experienced activity described in the report as a “land grab.”25  
 The report illustrates several interesting features of the current 
land grab:26 (1) there has been a substantial increase in the total area 
of land being transferred over the past five years, with nearly 2.5 
million hectares of land transferred during that time; (2) there has 
been increased investment in land both in terms of number of 
projects and area of land dedicated to those projects; (3) large-scale 
fees make up a minority of claims to arable land often cultivated by 
small-fee holders, but there is growing demand for those areas; (4) 
there is some indication of a trend towards an increase in the size of 
individual acquisitions, with land allocations measured in the 
hundreds of thousands;27 (5) a large percentage of land deals involve 
acquisition by private sector interests, though frequently with 
substantial support from the government; and (6) a substantial 
amount of the investment being made is derived from foreign 
sources.28 
Given the existence of a land grab, the apparent question is why.  
What are the motivations driving this land grab?  There are of course 
myriad factors involved but three seem to dominate:29 climate 
change, shifting global dietary patterns, and financial gain.30  First, 
the environmental concerns involved with climate change have 
provided an impetus for substantial investment in the research and 
                                                          
25  COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99–101. 
26  Of course, records of land deals in developing countries are not 
always available or reliable so the observations made by the report should be 
treated with caution.  They serve as indicators of general trends without the 
sort of statistical precision one might expect in other circumstances. 
27  This particular trend tends to be more localized in countries like 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, and Mali and is less pervasive throughout the 
continent. 
28  COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99. 
29  Based on the author’s personal observation during three and a half 
years in the Sahel, there seems to be a strong argument that the demand for 
timber constitutes a fourth factor.  Although this influence has been around 
for some time, global population spikes have led to increased demand for 
both domestic use as well as export.  Considering the rapid desertification 
that is occurring in the Sahel and the gradual intrusion of the Sahara south, 
there is good reason for residents of the Guinea Savannah to be concerned. 
30  COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 52–59. 
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development of alternative energy sources.31  Among the most 
promising of these are biofuels made from agricultural products 
which previously had been used almost exclusively for food 
consumption.32  Consequently, a sharp increase in the demand for 
agricultural products has brought with it an increased demand for 
arable land.  Additionally, concerns about climate change have led to 
an increased interest in maximizing the carbon offsetting value of 
land, a use that is not necessarily aligned with maximizing food or 
fuel production.33 
Second, the explosion of the global population has heightened 
the demand for food production.34  Although there is no need for 
concern that a Neo-Malthusian catastrophe is around the corner, 
rapid increases in population and consumption will necessarily put 
stress on production rates that are increasing at a much steadier rate.  
Portions of the Guinea Savannah already experience challenges in 
meeting the nutritional needs of the population without having to 
compete with wealthier consumers.  The challenge is further 
exacerbated by the fact that substantial portions of the world’s 
population are in the process of shifting from a predominantly 
vegetarian diet to a more Western-style diet, heavily supplemented 
with animal protein.35  Animal protein is not an efficient use of 
agricultural inputs because the amount of land needed to sustain 
livestock is disproportionate to the amount of sustenance it can 
provide.36  This shift in dietary patterns has magnified the effect of 
the population explosion and substantially increased the demand for 
arable land.37 
Third, due to the increased demand for arable land brought about 
by concerns of climate change and food production, the world 
                                                          
31  Id. at 54–56. 
32  Id.  
33  Id. at 58. 
34  Id. at 53. 
35  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS: THE 
ENVIRONMENT’S ROLE IN AVERTING THE FOOD CRISES 17 (Christian Nelleman 
et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.grida.no/files/publications 
/FoodCrisis_lores.pdf; see also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, A 
CALL FOR A STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TO THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 4–5 
(2008). 
36  See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 35, at 17. 
37  COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 54. 
140 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF    [Vol. 9.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
 
experienced a sharp increase in the monetary value of such land.38  
Given that the demand for arable land is likely to continue to rise, 
many now consider land acquisition to be a solid financial 
investment.  The global food shortage of 2007 and 2008 saw the 
price of many staple food products skyrocket throughout the world 
and made it abundantly clear that increased demand and generous 
rates of return on land investment are reliable expectations.39   
There are also disincentives to land acquisition as a form of 
investment, not least of which is the danger inherent in insecure 
tenure.  If a potential investor is not able to determine who owns a 
particular parcel of land, he will be unable to acquire it except via 
adverse possession or government intervention.  If a potential 
investor is not assured of the parcel’s ownership, he will risk 
answering a competing claim at a later point and losing any 
investments.  And these concerns are heightened when an investor 
attempts to assemble a large-scale fee out of several adjoining fees—
one problematic title can have repercussions throughout the area.  
These concerns not only disincentivize land acquisition but also lead 
to a lower value for the transfer. 
Yet insecure land tenure and other disincentives, including 
political instability and corruption, are likely to only hinder land 
acquisition.  At some point the potential benefits of investment in 
arable land will outweigh the risks, and the land grab report seems to 
indicate that this point is fast approaching.40  Several consequences 
are likely to result: First, landowners who do not currently have 
secure tenure are vulnerable to being dispossessed of their land.41  
                                                          
38  Id. at 56–58. 
39  Derek Heady & Shenggen Fan, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Causes and Consequences of Surging 
Food Prices, IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPER 00831, at 15–16 (2008), available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pubs/dp/ifpridp00831.pdf.  In the 
United States, the price of agricultural land has seen double-digit annual 
growth since 2005, demonstrating the rapid growth in demand for arable 
land.  Cynthia Nickerson et al., Trends in U.S. Farmland Values and 
Ownership, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ECON. INFO. BULL., Feb. 2012, at 34, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/377487/eib92_2_.pdf. 
40  See COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 99–102. 
41  George C. Schoneveld et al., Center for International Forestry 
Research, Towards Sustainable Biofuel Development: Assessing the Local 
Impacts of Large-Scale Foreign Land Acquisitions in Ghana § 4.2 
(forthcoming 2010), available at 
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Second, those who do possess secure tenure are unlikely to receive 
full value compensation for alienation of their titles.42  And third, 
disputes over titles are likely to lead to increased conflicts in courts 
and elsewhere.43 
Among the recommendations proffered by the land grab report, 
an emphasis on land tenure reform is again notable.  The authors 
indicate a need to address the usefulness of various land tenure 
policies.44  The most prominent approaches to land tenure either 
involve the establishment of an individual titling system or the 
recognition of customary communitarian land rights.45  These two 
systems are explicated and examined in the following section. 
 
III.   COMPETING PARADIGMS 
The majority of the literature on land tenure reform tends to 
focus on two core approaches.  The first involves the establishment 
of individual titles to parcels of land that are made fully alienable.46  
The approach draws heavily from a Western understanding of land 
tenure and claims to be forward looking in so far as it is intended to 
promote economic development.47  The second approach focuses on 
communal land use and draws primarily from traditional approaches 
to land tenure common in Africa.48  In this regard a communal tenure 
approach could be described as backward looking in so far as it is 
reflective of the history and culture of a society rather than 
aspirational. 
 
                                                                                                                
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-
1236436879081/5893311-1271205116054/schoneveld.pdf.  
42  Id.  
43  See Amanor, supra note 10, at 110–15. 
44  See COTULA ET AL., supra note 6, at 15. 
45  See Franklin Obeng-Odoom, Land Reforms in Africa: Theory, 
Practice, and Outcome, 36 HABITAT INT’L 161, 162–63 (2012), available at 
http://procasur.org/extractive-industries/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Land-
reform-in-Africa-Theory-pratice-outcomes_Obeng-Odoom.pdf. 
46  Id. at 162. 
47  KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139–40 (2006); Obeng-Odoom, supra note 
45, at 162.   
48  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163.   
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A.   INDIVIDUAL TITLING APPROACH 
The individual titling approach draws on the premise that 
economic development is based on access to credit.  In his book The 
Mystery of Capital, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto attempts 
to connect the recognition and protection of property rights with 
poverty reduction through economic advancement.49  This is a 
neoliberal approach that derives the brunt of its force from the notion 
that property is more secure when only one person has a valid legal 
claim to it.50 
As de Soto sees it, substantial resources are used to protect land 
when tenure is not secure.51  The allocation of resources to this end is 
understandable given the importance of land for subsistence.  
Consequently, landowners will leave able-bodied individuals at home 
to protect property limiting their ability to engage in economic 
activity.52  Similarly, farmers expend significant resources to 
demarcate boundaries and fence plots in order to prevent 
encroachment by neighbors.  For instance, in Ghana private security 
guards have become ubiquitous because of the need for someone to 
watch over property during the owner’s absence.53  The protection of 
current possessions is prioritized over the pursuit of new avenues for 
wealth production.  This is an inefficient use of resources.  An 
individual titling approach argues that this inefficiency can be 
remedied by the recognition and enforcement of individual 
ownership.54  If an individual has formal title that he realistically 
expects the government will enforce, then he can redirect resources 
towards wealth production.55 
Furthermore, individual land titling provides an incentive for 
investment in the land leading to enhanced productivity.56  If tenure 
is not secure, farmers are less likely to invest in their land because it 
will increase loss if property is seized.  Investment might even 
increase the likelihood of seizure because it makes the land more 
attractive.  And if the land is intended for communal use, the farmer 
                                                          
49  See generally DE SOTO, supra note 8. 
50  Id. at 39–67; DAM, supra note 47, at 134–141. 
51  See DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 61–62. 
52  DAM, supra note 47, at 138. 
53  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 164.   
54  DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 61–62. 
55  DAM, supra note 47, at 135. 
56  DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 49–51. 
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might fear that any new investments will be reaped by someone 
else.57  
By establishing an individual titling system, states can also 
create new access to capital to be used for investment.58  With secure 
title a poor farmer can obtain credit by using land as collateral.59  
Additionally, individually titled land can be fully and easily 
transferred.  This means a poor farmer can have access to money in 
times of need by liquidating all or part of his property.60  And 
because the title of the land is both secure and transferable, its value 
will increase regardless of how it is used.61 
Despite the arguments of de Soto and other neoliberal 
economists, this approach is foreign to many parts of the developing 
world, including most of Africa.62   Applying such a foreign system 
without alteration is likely to present substantial challenges.63  Since 
transition to individual land tenure is generally shepherded by the 
political and social elite, the process usually solidifies their 
positions.64  Vulnerable groups65 have less opportunity to assert their 
claim to property and consequently are less likely to have it formally 
recognized.66  Capital seems to be more myth than mystery for many 
non-elites.  Customary systems can be far from egalitarian,67 but they 
generally provide protection for vulnerable populations through 
mechanisms such as kinship networks.68 
Transition to an individual land tenure system can be daunting.  
Determining ownership, demarcating parcels, and establishing a 
reliable registration system require enormous effort and expense.  In 
addition, transition can bring to the surface latent disputes that need 
                                                          
57  Id. at 62. 
58  Id.  
59  Id. at 56–58. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167–68.   
63  Id.; see also Amanor, supra note 10, at 116–17. 
64  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167. 
65  For example, women, rural and urban poor, ethnic minorities, etc. 
66  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167; George A. Sarpong, 
Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor: Ghana – Country Case Study 
17 (FAO, LEP Working Paper No. 2, 2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/k0783e/k0783e00.pdf. 
67  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 167. 
68  Id. at 163. 
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to be litigated or otherwise resolved, placing a further drain on 
resources.69 
 
B.   COMMUNAL LAND TENURE 
Traditional land use in much of Africa70 conceptualizes land as 
property of the whole community.71  Members of the community are 
permitted to use the land, and the community has a mechanism to 
safeguard against exploitation; likewise, communal land tenures 
possess mechanisms that steward the land for the benefit of all.72  
It is important, however, to distinguish communal land use from 
open access.73  Hardin warned against the danger of open access 
leading to a “tragedy of the commons.”74  With open access there is 
no ownership of the land so all are able to exploit its resources.  With 
little incentive to preserve the land for future use, overexploitation 
seems inevitable.75  But communal land is different in that the 
                                                          
69  See Amanor, supra note 10, at 106–17. 
70  It is dangerous to be too precise at this point as the specific details of 
communal land arrangements can vary greatly.  The structure of traditional 
Ghanaian land use is taken up later. 
71  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163; Lennox Kwame Agbosu, Land 
Law in Ghana: Contradiction between Anglo-American and Customary 
Conceptions of Tenure and Practices 11 (Land Tenure Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 33, 2000) [hereinafter Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana] available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/12796/1/ltcwp33.pdf. 
72  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163. 
73  The distinction has been explained in great detail in the writings of 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom.  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING 
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds., 1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS] (explaining how mechanisms can emerge in the 
use of shared resources that avoid overexploitation associated with open 
access); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL 
RESOURCES (1994) (further developing the distinction between common pool 
resources and open access so as to minimize the threat of overexploitation). 
74  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243–45 (1968) [hereinafter Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons].  
In fairness, Hardin later narrowed the scope to what he would call the 
“tragedy of the unmanaged commons.”  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Unmanaged Commons, 9 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 199 (1994) 
(emphasis added). 
75  See generally Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 74. 
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community owns it.  Members of the community have the right to 
access the land and exclude outsiders.76  The community has a vested 
interest in preventing overexploitation and ensuring future fertility.77  
Communities develop systems to allocate land use within the 
community such as rotating plots or maintaining ancestral 
homesteads.78  Communities also establish criteria for non-member 
access when it is in the community’s interest.79  Decisions about 
admissions of non-members or allocations within the community are 
based on internal conflict-resolution systems such as councils of 
elders or chieftainships.80  
Communal land tenure has the notable advantage of being 
organic.  Because it is the result of social interactions over 
generations, it developed in a way that reflects the norms and values 
of the community.81  In much of Africa, kinship and social 
relationships are of paramount importance, and communal land 
tenure both reflects and reinforces these values.82  Communal land 
tenure resonates with the community by reflecting its social norms 
and thereby legitimizes land ownership.  These cultures view a 
community's claim to land as more legitimate, and that legitimacy 
enhances the tenure’s security.  
Additionally, the organic nature of these systems often includes 
built-in safety nets to protect against catastrophic events:83 A widow 
might be taken in by her husband’s family, an orphan might be 
adopted by extended family members, or an HIV positive individual 
might be cared for by the community as a whole.  This is not to 
suggest that acts of generosity do not occur within individual tenure 
systems, but in such societies, they tend to be just that—acts of 
generosity.  In communal land systems, the significance of kinship 
and social relationships underlying communal tenure also provides 
mechanisms that do not require altruism. 
                                                          
76  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 13. 
77  Id. 
78  See generally OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 73.  
79  UBINK, supra note 10, at 83. 
80  Id. 
81  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163. 
82  Id. 
83  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163; Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, 
supra note 71, at 9–14. 
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But for each advantage of communal tenure systems, there is a 
readily available counterpoint.  Even if communal titles have greater 
legitimacy and security, their communal ownership also makes them 
difficult to transfer.  Secure tenure might limit the wasting of 
resources on claim protection and create an incentive to invest in 
future productivity, but without transferability it does not provide the 
access to credit required for investment.84  If land cannot be 
transferred it cannot be used as collateral, and inalienability further 
reduces its value.85  
Similarly, although communal land tenure provides social safety 
nets these societies are often far from egalitarian.86  Although the 
community provides for widows, orphans, and HIV positive 
individuals in the event of catastrophe, these individuals are rarely 
given much autonomy.87  Maintaining traditional systems is unlikely 
to shift power dynamics; meaning vulnerable populations are apt to 
retain their position.  But, as discussed above, individual land tenure 
is no more likely to shift the positions of elite and vulnerable 
populations; even if individual tenure promotes autonomy in theory, 
it rarely does so in application.88  Moreover, individual tenure 
systems do risk undermining social networks that protect vulnerable 
populations.89 
 
IV.   QUESTION OF SCALE 
There is an additional consideration to examine before 
evaluating land tenure policies in Ghana—What scale of agricultural 
production is most conducive to economic development?  
Specifically, Is it better to have large or small farms?  
The answer to this question depends on numerous factors, both 
internal and external.90  The requirements of specific crops, regional 
fertility level, and availability of skilled workers impact a country’s 
agricultural potential.91  On a larger scale, the demands of global 
                                                          
84  See DE SOTO, supra note 8, at 56–58. 
85  Id. 
86  Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163. 
87  See Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 10–11. 
88  See Sarpong, supra note 66, at 17.  
89  See Obeng-Odoom, supra note 45, at 163. 
90  MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 12–20. 
91  Id. ¶¶ 9, 15–16. 
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capital, logistical issues of transporting goods to market, and the 
requirement that the origin of certain products be traceable will affect 
agricultural development.92  The scale of farms must align with these 
factors in order to maximize economic development.93  For example, 
if a crop requires intensive labor and the local population is capable 
of managing it, then small-scale farming would be ideal.  On the 
other hand, if there is limited available transportation for delivering 
goods to market, then a larger farm might benefit from an economy 
of scale that would allow it to transport goods in a more cost-
effective way.94  Similarly, if the end user needs to know the precise 
origin of the goods,95 then large-scale farms will be more capable of 
tracking product movement.96  The size of farms is not the only 
contributing factor; large farms hire workers when mechanization is 
impossible,97 small farms form cooperatives to capitalize on 
economies of scale,98 and technology makes traceability 
requirements easier to satisfy.  However, farm size remains one of 
the most significant influences on a country’s potential for 
agricultural development. 
The predominant determinant of farm size, and one on which a 
government has substantial influence, is the size of plots.  If large 
fees are possible then large farms become possible.  Policymakers 
impact the size of fees through the implementation of land tenure and 
regulatory systems—some encourage the consolidation of parcels 
into large fees while others incentivize retaining smaller fees or 
dividing larger ones.99  To take the two approaches discussed above 
as examples, the ease of transferability associated with individual 
titling systems allows one to compile a number of adjacent parcels 
and establish a large farm.  Community-based tenure systems, on the 
other hand, maximize output by dividing land into smaller parcels 
                                                          
92  Id. ¶¶ 12–20. 
93  See id. 
94  See id. ¶ 19 (noting that “economies of scale are found in the 
plantation crops and among highly perishable commodities that must be 
processed and/or shipped quickly”).  
95  For example, to satisfy regulatory requirements intended to prevent 
the intrusion of genetically modified crops into food stores or to enable the 
identification of public health threats. 
96  See MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶ 16. 
97  See id. 
98  See, e.g., id. ¶ 224. 
99  SCHONEVELD ET AL., supra note 41, §§ 4.1–4.2. 
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overseen by small farmers.100  Policymakers should consider the 
correlation between land tenure systems and farm size when shaping 
the future of their countries.  Two examples of rapid agricultural 
development presented in the CCAA report demonstrate the potential 
for both large- and small-scale approaches.101  The Cerrado region of 
Brazil followed a path marked by large-scale farms, and Northeast 
Thailand established agricultural prosperity with small-scale 
farms.102  Either approach can be effective in the appropriate 
circumstances.  Since scale is a significant factor in agricultural 
development, tailoring farm size to the specific circumstances can 
impact the rate of that development. 
In Brazil, the availability of credit and marketing services along 
with the government’s promotion of mechanization resulted in the 
dominance of large farms.103  In Thailand, an emphasis on land titling 
for small farmers meant that small-scale farms fueled the agricultural 
development.104  While both countries saw a marked increase in 
income levels and decrease in food costs, in Thailand, the small-scale 
approach had a greater impact on overall poverty levels.105  After a 
detailed discussion of the merits and challenges of large- and small-
scale farming, the CCAA report concludes that, with a few 
exceptions, the Guinea Savannah does not require a large-scale 
approach.106  Given the nature of the crops, the focus on regional 
markets, and the fertility of the land, the region is not likely to 
disproportionately benefit from large-scale farming.107  In light of the 
poverty reduction achieved through a small-scale approach in 
Thailand, the CCAA report suggests that policymakers apply the 
Thai approach to the Guinea Savannah.108  By limiting the ability to 
transfer or concentrate property as well as creating regulatory 
                                                          
100  Thomas Sikor & Daniel Müller, The Limits of State-Led Land 
Reform: An Introduction, 37 WORLD DEV. 1307, 1310–11 (2009). 
101  MORRIS ET AL., AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 12–20. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. ¶ 12. 
104  Id. ¶¶ 12–20. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. ¶ 14. 
107  For example, the Guinea Savannah would not benefit from 
economies of scale that large-scale farming provides.  Id. ¶¶ 14–18. 
108  Id. ¶ 14. 
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incentives for small farms, policymakers can emulate the success of 
Thailand.109   
 
V.   GHANA: A CASE STUDY 
We turn now to an examination of the situation in Ghana.  What 
is the current state of its land tenure system?  How is that approach 
likely to shape the country’s agricultural development in the coming 
years?  Can policymakers implement systems that will exploit the 
agricultural potential of the Guinea Savannah? 
 
A.   PRE-COLONIAL LAND TENURE 
The customary land tenure system in Ghana fell within the 
communal paradigm.110  With slight variation among ethnic groups, 
the predominant model was based on kinship relationships.111  The 
intertwining of social and familial relationships with land tenure 
permitted effective cultivation, while avoiding overexploitation.112  
Pre-colonial Ghanaian societies achieved this without the more 
formalized land interests seen in Western cultures.113 
In most ethnic groups, access to communal land depended on 
membership in the group, with outsiders excluded by default.114  
Furthermore, land access was not connected to social status and each 
member had equal right to use the land.115  In theory at least, access 
                                                          
109  While it is true that agricultural development is the result of 
numerous influences in addition to a country’s land tenure system, it is 
equally true that the approach to land tenure can have consequences in areas 
distinct from agriculture.  Land tenure systems can impact vulnerable 
populations including women, ethnic minorities, and people living with 
HIV/AIDS.  Similarly, land tenure policies can affect the environment 
through agriculture.  In an interrelated world, policymakers cannot focus 
exclusively on agricultural development.  Decisions aimed at development 
must remain cognizant of the impact on other areas. 
110  UBINK, supra note 10, at 42–43; Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra 
note 71, at 11. 
111  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 10–11; see also 
UBINK, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
112  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 11. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 9–14. 
115  Id. 
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to land was tied exclusively to community membership.116  It is 
tempting to analogize this approach to the Western concept of joint 
tenancy, where each individual owns the property as a whole and has 
the right to enjoy the whole, but the administration of land use in pre-
colonial Ghana resulted in quite a different system.  However, one 
may perhaps more usefully conceptualize this framework as 
something akin to a land trust intended to be used for the benefit of 
the community as a whole, including future generations.  
But in order to ensure that land use aligns with community 
interests, an administrative system is required; decisions must be 
made about who will cultivate which parcel, when to permit outsider 
access, and whether alienation serves the interest of the community.  
Land administration demonstrates distinct differences among ethnic 
groups in Ghana.117  In Ashanti and Akan communities, land 
administration was grafted onto political authority.118  The same 
person or group of people making political decisions (frequently a 
chief or council of elders) also made decisions about land use.119  In 
contrast, among the Ewe and other non-Akan communities, political 
authority was separate from land administration and family heads 
were the decision makers.120  In other groups, religious leaders made 
decisions about land use.121  Yet, in all cases, whomever made 
decisions was expected to promote the benefit of the community as a 
whole.122  
Safeguarding mechanisms assured decisions were made 
accordingly.  The decision to permit use by outsiders or sell land, for 
example, would require approval by a council of elders.123  These 
safeguards had varying degrees of formality and were enforced by 
social and kinship networks.  People understood that the land 
belonged to the community or the community’s ancestors and 
expected their leaders to act accordingly.  The concept of stool lands 
found among the Ga-Mashie and other ethnic groups exemplifies this 
                                                          
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 14–16. 
118  Id. at 11–12. 
119  Id. at 14. 
120  Id. at 14–15. 
121  Id.  In some cases these religious leaders also exercised political 
theory but just as often did not.  
122  LUND, supra note 10, at 48–49; UBINK, supra note 10, at 42. 
123  See, e.g., UBINK, supra note 10, at 43–44. 
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conceptualization of land tenure.124  In these communities, a chief or 
political leader occupies a wooden.125  Similar to the idea of a throne 
in a monarchy or the Chair of St. Peter in Roman Catholic tradition, 
an individual might occupy the stool but the authority exercised is 
vested within the position and associated with the stool itself.126  The 
stool, as explained by Agbosu, “is believed to embody the spirits of 
the ancestors and the souls of the body politic subject to the 
jurisdictional authority of the person occupying it.”127  Consequently, 
allodial title belongs to the community—past, present, and future—
and the chief is responsible for administering it accordingly.  Again, 
the analogy to a land trust seems useful, if not exact. 
The efficacy of the traditional approach to land tenure in Ghana 
is evidenced by the complex society that existed prior to 
colonization.  When Westerners arrived on the coast of what would 
become Ghana, they found an intricate system of groups engaged in 
trade and interaction throughout West and North Africa.128  These 
groups managed to cultivate both the agricultural potential and 
mineral resources of the region.129  The literature indicates that this 
remains the de facto approach to land tenure in a large part of Ghana, 
even if formal de jure property laws suggest a more Western 
approach.130  This inconsistency of de facto and de jure tenure 
constitutes one component of the challenge facing policymakers.  
Yet, it should not be assumed that the circumstances of pre-colonial 
West Africa are identical with present-day Ghana or that an approach 
that has been useful in the past will be equally efficacious in the 
modern era of globalization.  As Ubink points out, a romanticized 
view of traditional customary land use is challenged by the 
realization that population growth, increased land value, and 
reduction in new frontiers has led to the commodification of land.131  
                                                          
124  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 14. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 14 n.42.  But see UBINK, supra note 10, at 44–46 (suggesting 
some chiefs believed they had a right to collect rent on stool lands). 
127  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 14 n.42. 
128  Id. at 11. 
129  Id. 
130  See LUND, supra note 10, at 46; see also UBINK, supra note 10, at 
99–102.  
131  UBINK, supra note 10, at 17–18; see also Kojo Sebastion Amanor, 
Tree Plantations, Agricultural Commodification, and Land Tenure Security 
in Ghana, in LEGALISING LAND RIGHTS: LOCAL PRACTICES, STATE 
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This commodification threatens the administration of customary land 
and results in a distinct lack of tenure security.132  
 
B.   THE BRITISH INFLUENCE 
Interaction with Western colonial powers altered land tenure in 
West Africa, and the system in Ghana was inevitably shaped by 
British influence.133  Even before the Gold Coast was officially 
declared a British protectorate in 1874, administrative authorities 
applied English statutory law to local land tenure issues.134  Yet, fully 
alienable property established by formal title was a foreign notion to 
indigenous populations, and its application led to substantial 
confusion during the British colonial period. 
Traditional land use was enforced via kinship networks, and 
elaborate ceremonies memorialized significant land transfers.  These 
ceremonies assured recipients that the transfer would not be forgotten 
and their rights challenged.135  Yet the concept of property ownership 
separate from possessory interest was completely foreign.  That 
ownership could be vested in something as innocuous as a piece of 
paper seemed unfathomable.  Consequently, when illiterate chiefs 
and community leaders transferred title under the colonial system it 
is doubtful they comprehended the ramifications of the action.136  At 
best, traditional communities viewed the deed as a memorialization 
of an agreement to permit use rather than an instrument of 
divestment.137 
Merchants and other elites were familiar with English property 
law and often mediated conveyances between local communities and 
Western interests.138  However, these conveyances were framed by 
European property law and artificially interjected the concept of 
                                                                                                                
RESPONSES AND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 133 
(Janine M. Ubink et al. eds., 2009). 
132  See Amanor, supra note 10, at 131. 
133  See Victor Essien, Sources of Law in Ghana, 24 J. BLACK STUDIES 
246 (1994) (discussing the interplay between colonial and customary 
influences in contemporary Ghanaian law, both property and otherwise).   
134  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 24. 
135  Id. at 16. 
136  Id. at 23. 
137  Id. at 16–18. 
138  Id. at 18–19. 
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individual ownership into the land tenure system.139  Unsurprisingly, 
myriad conflicts arose as the problems of a dual tenure system 
emerged without an adequate means of mediation.140  One person 
would claim the right to use a parcel of land based on the purchase of 
paper title, while another person claimed the same land as member of 
the community that traditionally cultivated it.141  Conflicts became so 
widespread that a West African Land Committee was established in 
1912.142  Although the Committee’s final report was never officially 
published, it determined that some 36,000 square miles of land had 
been transferred from customary ownership within the colony.143  
The colonial administration claimed authority over an area that 
included less than 25,000 square miles.144  The discrepancy was 
almost certainly due to duplicate claims and multiple conveyances.  
Mass confusion resulted in countless disputes that were resolved 
within a legal framework that disadvantaged indigenous 
communities.145  
Some have argued that the initial transfers of land from 
communal ownership were not valid under English property law.146  
They argue that because the ownership of land was vested in the 
community as the whole, chiefs did not have the authority to divest 
the community of land but merely to oversee its administration.147  
Claims of authority were irrelevant because the sale of land under 
color of title is still invalid.148  But this would mean that stool lands 
could never be transferred short of a unanimous decision by the 
community as a whole, and even then the interest of future 
generations would be ignored.  Yet, making communal land entirely 
non-transferable does not comport with traditional notions either.  
Some representative of the community must have the authority to 
                                                          
139  See LUND, supra note 10, at 104–07. 
140  See id.; see also Charles U. Ilegbune, Concessions Scramble and 
Land Alienation in British Southern Ghana (1885-1915), 19 AFR. STUD. REV.  
17, 17 (1976); see also Amanor, supra note 10, at 110–15. 
141  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 19. 
142  Ilegbune, supra note 140, at 17. 
143  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 19. 
144  Id. 
145  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 19; Ilegbune, supra 
note 140, at 17. 
146  Agbosu, Land Law in Ghana, supra note 71, at 21. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
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alienate it.149  For all practical purposes, the argument is moot; no 
serious policymaker would suggest voiding all land transfers away 
from communal ownership, it is simply not realistic.  Instead the 
modern state of Ghana must face the hodgepodge legacy of its 
colonial past and develop a coherent strategy for minimizing and 
resolving disputes.  Ghana’s attempts, both successful and otherwise, 
are taken up in the next section.  
 
C.   THE POST-INDEPENDENCE MILIEU 
Following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast, now Ghana, 
faced the challenges of a nation emerging from colonial rule.  Self-
rule was far from easy, and sorting out an effective and efficient land 
tenure system was essential to establishing a solid foundation for 
stability and future growth.  
In 1962, the Land Registry Act required all private transfers to 
be in writing and registered.150  A Lands Commission was 
established by the 1969 Constitution and tasked with overseeing the 
registration of titles and administration of public lands.151  A few 
years later the Ghanaian legislature extended the registration 
requirement to include conveyances of communal land.152  Attempts 
to enforce the new requirement included increased power for the 
Lands Commission, but ultimately fell flat.153  The statute was later 
repealed, but the attempt to regulate land transfers did not stop, and 
in 1980 the Lands Commission began requiring property owners to 
obtain its consent prior to any alienation.154  Six years later, persistent 
in its attempts to regulate land use, the Lands Commission began 
requiring the registration of all title of ownership, not simply 
transference deeds.155  The Lands Commission then aggressively 
campaigned to register all titles with unimpressive results; from the 
                                                          
149  See id. at 16–17. 
150  Land Registry Act, No. 122 (1962) (Ghana). 
151  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ch. 21. 
152  Conveyancing Decree, NRCD 175 (1973) (Ghana). 
153  KASIM KASANGA & NII ASHIE KOTEY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE 
FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, LAND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA: 
BUILDING ON TRADITION AND MODERNITY 22–23 (2001), available at 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9002IIED.pdf. 
154  Lands Commissions Act § 3(1), No. 401, (1980) (Ghana). 
155  Land Title Registration Law, PNDCL 152 (1986) (Ghana). 
2012]            SECURING LAND TENURE & AGRICULTURAL 155 
                        DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH: A  
 GHANAIAN CASE STUDY   
program’s implementation in 1986 until 2006 only 42,000 
applications for title were filed and less than 30% of those were 
successfully registered.156  
The Ghanaian government viewed colonial administrative 
mechanisms as its only tool for sorting out its land tenure issues but 
applied this tool disingenuously.  As a result, individual titling 
became further entrenched in the Ghanaian system.157  It had become 
apparent, however, that a complete shift to this approach was not 
practical.  Perhaps it was for this reason that the 1992 Ghanaian 
Constitution formally recognized customary communal land tenure 
within areas identified as “stool lands.”158  Additionally, an 
Administer of Stool Lands was created to ensure rents were paid to 
the communities for the use of stool lands.  This recognition marked 
a shift away from an approach exclusively focused on individual 
titling.  Unfortunately, this recognition would again be muted as 
emphasis returned to title registration over the coming decade.159 
In 1999, the Ghanaian government admitted the shortcomings of 
its land tenure system and committed itself to reform that would 
solidify tenure security.160  Three years later, details of the Ghanaian 
plan focused again on title registration; 161 the Ghanaian government 
had doubled down.  The government tasked the Land Administration 
Project (LAP) with comprehensive reform of the country’s land 
tenure system and oversight of the numerous agencies involved.162  
Notably, this plan extended title registration (as opposed to deed 
registration) to the whole country rather than merely the initial 
                                                          
156  KELSEY JONES-CASEY & AMANDA KNOX, WORLD RES. INST.  FOCUS 
ON LAND IN AFRICA BRIEF: GHANA, LESSON 4: LAND ADMINISTRATION AT A 
CROSSROADS 2 (2011), available at http://landportal.info/sites/default/ 
files/ghana_brief4_landesa.pdf. 
157  See generally L.K. Agbosu, Land Registration in Ghana: Past, 
Present and the Future, 34 J. AFR. L. 104 (1990) [hereinafter Agbosu, Land 
Registration in Ghana]. 
158  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ch. 21. 
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handful of districts to which it had previously applied.163  This 
resulted in a rush to register titles, and Ghanaians inundated the Land 
Register with claims that had to be validated to prevent fraud.164  
In the past few years, the government has attempted to 
streamline transitional oversight by creating a new Lands 
Commission that has assumed responsibility for title registration, 
land surveying, valuation, and administration.165  Numerous non-
governmental organizations as well as bilateral and multilateral 
government collaborations are providing the resources required for 
such a comprehensive initiative.166  With boots on the ground and 
financial backing, policymakers are hoping that the initiative will 
achieve greater success than that realized in the 1980s. 
For the time being, the Ghanaian government intends to pursue a 
land tenure system modeled on the de Soto approach.  Although 
communities are permitted to register land within Ghana’s system, 
there are significant barriers in place.167  The result is a de facto shift 
towards individual titles.168  But the long-term effects of this shift are 
far from clear.  Many criticize these policies as further 
disadvantaging vulnerable populations or creating dangerous 
environmental impacts.169  These critiques are worthy of 
                                                          
163  MINISTRY OF LANDS AND FORESTRY, supra note 160, at 3 (1999). 
164  See Theodora Mantebea Mends & Johan De Meijere, A Study of the 
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Rights for Urban Development: An Example of Accra, Ghana, Remarks at 
5th FIG Reg’l Conference: Promoting Land Administration and Good 
Governance (Accra, Ghana, March 8-11, 2006) (explaining the substantial 
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166  For example, Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), 
International Land Systems (ILS), and Medeem Institute. 
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2012]            SECURING LAND TENURE & AGRICULTURAL 157 
                        DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH: A  
 GHANAIAN CASE STUDY   
consideration and warrant policy alterations in their own right, but 
the present question is whether these policies lead to agricultural 
development and poverty reduction.  Certainly, the consensus among 
most global policymakers is that individual land titling will lead to 
these outcomes; however, not everyone is so confident.170 
 
D.   LOOKING FORWARD 
The Ghanaian government seems committed to the de Soto 
approach.  The previous failure of this approach has been explained 
as the result of poor implementation—previous efforts lacked the 
resources necessary for proper implementation.  The current strategy 
places renewed emphasis on a comprehensive effort to register 
ownership throughout the country.171  Partner institutions that hope to 
spur future development have provided the substantial resources 
required for this undertaking. 172   The Ghanaian government views 
this enormous project as a prerequisite for development, and, 
consequently, has made it a priority.173  
However, it is unclear how the legacy of communal land tenure 
will affect this undertaking.  Although the Ghanaian Constitution 
officially recognizes communal land,174 such land is given little 
thought otherwise.  Based on Ghana’s experience during the colonial 
period, there is little reason to believe that a dual tenure system will 
not persist—that community land will remain the de facto tenure 
system while individual titling will serve a largely de jure function.  
The resulting insecurity will not create a scenario in which the 
country can capitalize on its agricultural opportunity.  International 
developers will be less interested, and those who do invest will refuse 
to pay full value for insecure title.  Likewise, local interests will be 
                                                          
170  Peter Rosset, Tides Shift on Agrarian Reform: New Movements 
Show the Way, 7 BACKGROUNDER, WINTER 2001, available at http:/ 
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WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 63 (2011). 
172  See discussion, supra note 166 and accompanying text.  
173  See discussion, supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
174  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ch. 21. 
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undermined and vulnerable groups ignored during the ensuing land 
grab.  The whole process will likely be characterized by conflict.  In 
the end, Ghana will have a system of large-scale agriculture.  GDP 
will almost certainly increase but do very little to alleviate poverty.  
The elite will enjoy the benefits of agricultural development while 
basic human rights are put in jeopardy. 
While Ghana’s attempt to replace community tenure suggests a 
negative outcome, returning to the pre-colonial communal system 
seems equally naive.  A hybrid system appears inevitable at this 
point.175  This does not mean, however, that a hybrid system must 
take the hodgepodge form of the colonial era.  A review of that 
period indicates that the disorder was due to failure to systematically 
integrate the two approaches.176  By making a strong push towards 
nationwide individual titling, the Ghanaian government aims to 
replace one approach with another and in so doing ignores the 
lessons of its past.  Not only will complete replacement fail, it is 
likely to hamper any potential for development.  On the other hand, a 
conscientious integration of the two approaches offers the 
opportunity to recognize the normative values of the communal 
approach while preparing to enter the global market.177 
Ghana can put the same effort toward securing communal land 
that it is currently doing for individual land.  If title is established for 
communities, then that land will be available for agricultural 
development.  The security of the title will increase the value of the 
land and provide the communities with access to credit in order to 
develop it further.  With secure tenure as the crux of most 
development models (including de Soto’s), the resulting limitations 
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on transferability are less significant.  Of course, the land is still 
transferable even if traditional administration makes it more difficult.  
But given the CCAA’s preference for small-scale agriculture within 
the Guinea Savannah, the need to assemble large tracts of land is not 
present—meaning that transferability is even less of a concern.  A 
hybrid system that institutionalizes both communal and individual 
title accompanied by a strong administrative system is likely to be 
Ghana’s best hope for taking advantage of its position as part of 
“Africa’s Sleeping Giant.”  
 
CONCLUSION 
The example of Ghana demonstrates the complex situation of 
land tenure throughout the Guinea Savannah.  Nearly all countries 
within the region have experienced the imposition of Western 
conceptualizations of property law through colonial influences.  Yet, 
rarely have individual tenure systems completely usurped the place 
of customary law.  Consequently, most of the Guinea Savannah faces 
varying amalgamations of both individual and communal land.  Mass 
confusion and conflict frequently result, creating a quagmire for 
agricultural development.  If these countries wish to capitalize on 
their potential, then policymakers must first manage to unravel the 
Gordian knot of their disorderly land tenure systems.  Without doing 
so, they will have difficulty providing the security necessary to 
replicate the prosperity of Brazil or Thailand. 
Western-styled individual tenure systems do not resonate with 
the normative values of the region and consequently fail to provide 
the level of capital de Soto suggests.  Conversely, traditional 
communal tenure systems ignore the impact of two centuries of 
colonial influence.  Policymakers must, as a practical matter, pursue 
a hybrid model that incorporates elements of both the individual and 
communal approaches.  By structuring the current hodgepodge into 
an organized system, policymakers can minimize conflicts.  
Additionally, the stabilization of tenure systems will increase land 
value and strengthen the countries’ potential for agricultural 
development in a way that alleviates poverty and establishes a 
foundation for human rights. 
  
